The 2010 UN climate conference in Cancún emphasised that 'Parties should, in all climate change related actions, fully respect human rights'. However, so far there is no further guidance. This article discusses the relevant legal human rights norms and two case studies from the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The first case (Bajo Aguán, Honduras) shows that the current absence of any international safeguards can lead to registration of highly problematic projects. The second case (Olkaria, Kenya) suggests that safeguards, introduced here as a side effect of World Bank involvement, can have a positive impact, but that it is necessary to have them based on human rights. It therefore seems recommendable for the UN climate regime to develop mandatory human rights safeguards.
Introduction
Climate change mitigation requires the fundamental restructuring of economies. This shift entails large-scale investments in the near future, which -as all large-scale projects -have a high potential to infringe human rights. In 2009, a report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) highlighted 'human rights implications' of climate change response measures and states' respective human rights duties. 1 The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is based on the principle of sustainable development, whose links to human rights have been made explicit in the nonbinding 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and its follow-ups. 2 However, the UNFCCC and its mechanisms perpetuate an understanding of sustainability which is reduced to abating greenhouse gas emissions. It was only in 2010 at the 16 th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 16) that governments acknowledged 'that
Parties should, in all climate change related actions, fully respect human rights'. 3 While COP decisions are non-binding, human rights are laid down in legally binding international treaties.
The COP 16 text is therefore an acknowledgement that the international climate regime needs to be designed in coherence with the human rights regime.
This article analyses the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
from a human rights perspective. The CDM was chosen because it is so far the largest international mitigation policy instrument for developing countries. It has about 7,500 registered projects, with another 1,400 projects in the pipeline (UNEP Risø 2014). At the same time, due to greater socio-economic and socio-political inequalities as well as weak human rights institutions, the infringement of human rights is more likely in developing than in industrialised countries.
The article first outlines relevant human rights norms which are, by experience, frequently impaired by large-scale projects and discusses the responsibility of external actors. Next, the article looks into the characteristics of the CDM and the pitfalls experienced in aligning it with human rights standards. The article then discusses two CDM projects, the case of Bajo Aguán in Honduras and the case of Olkaria in Kenya. The two cases were chosen to contrast different situations regarding the application of international safeguards in projects. The Bajo Aguán project is a purely private investment and does not involve international finance or development cooperation. As the CDM approval process does not include any social standards this project is thus characterised by the complete absence of international safeguards. In contrast, the Olkaria project is co-financed by international lenders, including the World Bank and the European Investment Bank (EIB), which makes the project subject to the World Bank's operational policies.
The case analysis was conducted as desk studies based on publicly available material. The selected cases serve to conceptualise the role of human rights in the CDM in order to lay the basis for further empirical research, which has so far been lacking. While there is a substantial amount of peer reviewed literature on technical design problems and the environmental effectiveness of the CDM, there has so far been only little empirical work on negative social and human rights impacts of CDM projects (TERI, 2012) .
Development, Climate Policies, and Human Rights
Large-scale development investments always come at a cost, which is often borne by the weakest segments of society. For example, during the 1990s alone between 90 and 100 million people were evicted globally due to infrastructure programmes (dams, urbanization, roads, etc.) (Cernea 1997 (Cernea , 1570 . Climate policies today need to take into account the experiences from large-scale projects of the past to avoid making the same mistakes.
Depending on the severity of livelihood infringements, large-scale investments in green development pathways potentially threaten the enjoyment of human rights (Schade 2012) .
Human rights law is usually interpreted as defining vertical duties of the state towards individuals and certain groups under its jurisdiction. Generally, states have a threefold duty:
the negative duty to respect (not to breach human rights), and the positive duties to protect (from human rights breaches by third parties) and to fulfil (using active measures to realize) human rights. With respect to the CDM this means that host countries bear the primary responsibility when projects negatively impact human rights. However, due to the substantial involvement of external actors in the CDM, such as project developers, donors, international financial institutions, and buyers of carbon credits, the question of extra-territorial obligations (ETOs) of states arises, i.e. which duties states have towards individuals and groups who are outside of their jurisdiction. Equally the responsibilities of the involved business entities to respect human rights have to be discussed. Before doing so the following outlines the relevant human rights norms.
Relevant Norms
The UN Human Rights Charter, consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the two major international human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), provide for a series of substantive and procedural rights. Regional human rights treaties are of similar content.
The ICCPR protects the right to life (Art. 2(1)) and the right to liberty and personal security as well as the right to physical, psychic and moral integrity (Art. 7). Both might be of relevance in situations where investments contribute to violent conflicts. The right to life, moreover, is frequently used in human rights jurisdiction to condemn life-threatening changes in the environment (Knox 2009, 13) . Additionally, the ICESCR provides for the right to an adequate standard of living, 'including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions' (Art. 11), and for the right to health (Art. 12).
From these two articles the ICESCR treaty body derives the right to water because water is 'fundamental for life and health '. 4 Crucial in the context of development-based evictions is the right to property, which protects from expropriation or at least from expropriation without adequate compensation.
The right to property is laid down in the UDHR Art. 17 and in all regional civil and political human rights treaties. 5 Of particular relevance is the question of land ownership, which often leads to violent conflicts in the context of large-scale investments. 6 The right to housing addresses this problem by defining 'legal security of tenure' to be part of it. 7 The question of land and land ownership is of particular concern where mitigation projects expand into the territories of indigenous people, as it is frequently the case, for example, with forest programmes or hydropower stations. 
Extraterritorial Obligations and Obligations of Business Actors
The question remains whether it is only the host state of a CDM project which bears the duties to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of the local population. Traditionally, ETOs have been interpreted as being limited to undertaking steps 'individually and through international assistance and co-operation …with the view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized by the [ICESCR] …', which includes the adoption of political and legislative measures. 12 However, for about a decade a broader interpretation of ETOs has been promoted by human rights treaty bodies and progressive legal experts.
Contemplating the legal meaning of ICESCR Art. 2(1), scholars deduct an extraterritorial duty of states to respect by requiring 'to ensure that [a state] does not undermine the enjoyment of rights of those in foreign territory' (Craven 2007, 253) and not to 'interfere with other states' ability to meet their obligations' (Knox 2009, 206 regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction', they see 'strong policy reasons' to do so. 16 In situations with a state-business nexus they call on states to require human rights due diligence from companies, even beyond their territorial borders (Heydenreich et al. 2014, 32) . 17 Due diligence is required in all business relationships, along the entire value chain. According to the Ruggie Guidelines corporate responsibilities to respect human rights include appropriate measures to prevent, mitigate, and remedy human rights infringements and abuses. 19 The guidelines also recommend the consideration of internationally agreed instruments that elaborate inter alia on the rights of 'specific groups', including the 'rights of indigenous peoples ' and 'ethnic minorities'. 20 In addition to available state-based complaints mechanisms the guidelines moreover recommend in paragraphs 31(d) and (h) to establish operational-level grievance mechanisms that address imbalances between stakeholders and which provide for a legitimate and independent third-party mechanism if adjudication is needed.
In sum, there exist several extraterritorial human rights duties in the context of the CDM.
States which are parties to human rights treaties and to the UNFCCC have an obligation to use their negotiation and voting power to work towards ensuring that the UNFCCC and its mechanisms do not jeopardise human rights. Similarly, the World Bank and other lending institutions and their board members have a responsibility to ensure that the projects they support do not harm human rights. And finally, there even exist international agreed guidelines how investing business actors, domestic and international ones, should respect human rights and be regulated accordingly.
The Clean Development Mechanism and Human Rights
The CDM as an international mechanism to stimulate climate-friendly investments can be regarded to have a strong state business-nexus. In particular the project registration procedure offers ample means to influence business behaviour. The PDD needs to be validated, i.e. examined as to whether it meets all CDM requirements, by an independent certification company accredited with the Board, called Designated
Operational Entity (DOE). The project needs to be approved by the countries involved, that is, the host country and the buyer country or countries. If all requirements are met, the project is formally registered by the Board and may subsequently be issued CERs, subject to adequate monitoring of the achieved reductions by the project participants and verification by another DOE.
The CDM modalities and procedures deal almost exclusively with questions of how to quantify emission reductions. There is no mention of human rights. The only hook for human rights concerns is the requirement that projects contribute to sustainable development and a requirement to invite and duly take account of stakeholder comments. All these items are addressed as part of the PDD.
However, there are no internationally agreed criteria or procedures for assessing CDM projects' contributions to sustainable development, nor are there internationally agreed procedures for conducting local stakeholder consultations. While the EU suggested including such standards and procedures when the MA were negotiated, developing countries rejected these proposals as being incompatible with their national sovereignty (Yamin and Depledge 2004) . The MA therefore do not go beyond requiring confirmation by the host country that the project assists it in achieving sustainable development, without giving further specification.
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The stakeholder consultation has two levels, local stakeholder consultation and global stakeholder consultation. Regarding local stakeholder consultations, the MA merely state that comments shall be invited and that the project participants need to provide a summary of the comments received and a report of how any comments received were duly taken into account. 24 There is no specification of who exactly to consult and how to consult them. Rules for the global stakeholder consultation are somewhat more specified. The DOE needs to make the PDD publicly available for 30 days for comments from Parties, stakeholders and 21 The Marrakesh Accords contain detailed implementation rules for the Kyoto Protocol, particularly regarding emissions accounting and the functioning of (the) flexible mechanisms. 
Cases

The Bajo Aguán Case in Honduras
The CDM project has the official title 'Aguan biogas recovery from Palm Oil Mill Effluent (POME) ponds and biogas utilisation -Exportadora del Atlántico, Aguan/Honduras'.
According to the PDD, the project optimises the wastewater treatment system of the palm oil However, the adequacy of the consultation cannot be verified externally since key documentation is not publicly available. The CDM PDD and the validation report neither include copies of the newspaper advertisements that were supposedly published, nor do they contain lists of the invitees and attendants of the stakeholder meeting that was supposedly carried out. The validation report also does not specify what steps were taken by the validators to assess the validity of the information and the adequacy of the consultation.
NGOs raised the human rights issues with the CDM Executive Board (CDM Watch 2011a; 2011c), but the Board nevertheless decided to register the project in July 2011. While the Board did not react officially to the human rights allegations, its then chair, Martin
Hession, told the news website EurActiv that they had no means to block registration since their mandate covered only the GHG impacts of projects (EurActiv 2011).
After the UK government, which had issued a letter of approval to the project, had been made aware of the allegations by CDM Watch (2011b), then UK Energy and Climate
Secretary Chris Huhne responded that the allegations were 'disturbing' but pointed to the host country as having primary responsibility regarding sustainable development (Huhne 2011 ). Finally, so far no CERs have been issued to the project, but when they are, there is no mechanism to stop these credits from being imported into the EU and used in the EU ETS.
In conclusion, the CDM modalities and procedures leave the question of whether a project contributes to sustainable development at the discretion of the host country. This leaves no remedy for cases where the host country government itself is involved in human rights violations, as is allegedly the case in Bajo Aguán. While it is not clear whether the palm oil mill and thus the CDM project itself is causing additional human rights violations, the mill reportedly sources its raw material from land that has been the object of violent conflicts for almost a decade. 
The Olkaria Case in Kenya
Kenya is party to the ICCPR and to the ICESCR as well as to the Convention Against Racial A closer look at the de facto procedures, however, reveals weaknesses. Firstly, only two days were given between the first notice that the communities had to move and the first census (GIBB Africa 2012, 2). Two days are arguably not in line with OP 4.12 (13(a)) to provide the affected with 'timely and relevant information', which would allow them to deliberate and consult on their options properly.
Secondly, the area which was vacated for the plant comprises 4,200 acres and there exists no assessment whether the 1,700 acres will suffice to maintain the cattle of the pastoralist Maasai. Further, Kedong Ranch Ltd. has asked to fence the area, which would hinder the Maasai to switch to neighbouring grasslands if necessary (for example during droughts). Asking why they are compensated only 1,700 acres they were advised that they had no title deed to any of the land (KenGen 2012, 117) . This arguably contravenes OP 4.12 The CDM registration process for Olkaria IV was, however, unspectacular. The PDD mentions the land dispute on Kedong Ranch, the claim of the Maasai to be considered in job offerings and to get appropriate compensation. KenGen's summarised response in the PDD is that relocations will be organised according to standards, that funds will be provided for community projects, and that Maasai applications for jobs will be considered in case of appropriate skills, but it does not include, for instance, an offer for appropriate job training, (CDM Executive Board 2012, 28f.) . The PDD recognises that 99% of respondents have been aware of the project, which is not surprising considering its relevance for local livelihoods and media coverage. Unfortunately, the PDD does not include any documentation of the local stakeholder consultation process and whether also opponents with their complaints had been heard. The global stakeholder consultation was without response. As the DOE received, in its view, no major objections against the project, the registration was enacted on 17 June 2013, around the same time that the quarrels started again.
The main human rights duty bearer is the State of Kenya, even more so as it owns a 70% share of KenGen (GIBB Africa 2012, Appendix 2). However, also the World Bank and its board should incorporate rights-based principles such as FPIC in the applied social safeguards, and the Bank should give guidance to lending countries accordingly. The group of lenders, in particular the EIB, which is directly subject to the EU's human rights commitments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, failed to design an operational-level grievance mechanism that builds upon the human rights-based Ruggie Guidelines.
Conclusions: Options for Integrating Human Rights in Climate Policies
Both case studies show that CDM projects potentially feed into pre-existing conflicts. In both cases this is related to conflicts over land ownership, which confirms the observation of the ICESCR treaty body in its General Comment No. 7 on forced evictions and the right to housing that conflicts over land are a major problem in case of development-based evictions.
The cases indicate that responsibilities of host governments for human rights infringements in the context of CDM projects might range from direct and gross violations by state security forces as in Bajo Aguán to dubious behaviour of companies as in Olkaria and the omission or failure of a host state to protect from both. Additionally, the case of Olkaria on the one hand demonstrates that social safeguard policies, here applied due to World Bank involvement, can have a positive impact on the affected. On the other hand it shows, firstly, that the procedural rules and their implementation require more attention and precise guidance.
Secondly, it demonstrates that the CDM cannot rely on social safeguards applied by chance due to donor involvement. The evictions in the neighbourhood of Olkaria IV indicate that the same company can behave differently if it feels no pressure to comply with social standards.
From both cases it follows that the CDM needs a mandate of its own to apply social safeguard policies, firstly to provide the same guidance for all kinds and constellations of stakeholders, and secondly to be in the position to reject or withdraw project registrations if necessary. In case of Bajo Aguán this would at least have prevented the provision of international resources to an alleged perpetrator of grave human rights violations.
In our regard such guidelines should be human rights-based. Based on the elaborations on ETOs in sub-chapter 3, we argue that not just the host states but also It is therefore recommendable to develop mandatory human rights safeguards at the UNFCCC level. In the best case, these would help to avoid human rights violations by providing standards and guidance for realising human rights-compatible CDM projects. At a minimum, they would prevent the CDM from becoming involved in pre-existing situations that involve human rights violations, as in the Bajo Aguán project.
As a first step states who are parties to human rights treaties should comply with their duty to use their voting power in the UNFCCC to ensure that its mechanisms do not impact negatively on human rights. They thus should continuously lobby for a human rights-based understanding of sustainable development within the UNFCCC, which matches its meaning in respective declarations on sustainable development.
Following the Maastricht Principles the UNFCCC could and should require all projects to undergo a human rights impact assessment (HRIA) with clear procedural requirements for stakeholder consultations, making projects with negative impacts ineligible for registration.
Similarly, the Ruggie Guidelines call on states to require human rights due diligence from companies in cases of a state-business nexus. Consequently, there should also be a procedure to de-register projects in cases where human rights violations become apparent only during implementation.
Applied procedural requirements should include access to redress, i.e. complaints mechanisms, internationally, nationally and at the operational-level. Operational-level grievance mechanisms should at least comply with the internationally accepted Ruggie
Guidelines on business and human rights.
As many projects under the CDM and other UNFCCC mechanisms are related to the exploitation or preservation of natural resources, particular attention should be given to the rights of indigenous people and their related property rights. This should ideally include taking into account the provisions of UNDRIP and its interpretation of FPIC.
Such reform of CDM registration procedures would require a respective mandate for the DOE to assess those additional standards.
However, developing countries have so far strongly rejected all suggestions to internationally define standards for sustainability assessments and stakeholder consultations as infringements of their national sovereignty.
If no movement is possible at the UNFCCC level, individual buyer countries or groups of countries, such as the EU, could alternatively introduce their own additional requirements for CDM projects. Indeed, the EU is bound to the amendments of the Lisbon Treaty with their commitment to extraterritorial human rights obligations, at a minimum an obligation to respect. More concretely, the EU and EU countries have three possible points of intervention.
Firstly, the transfer of CERs to industrialised countries requires the issuance of a letter of approval to the project by an industrialised country. Cournil et al (2012) suggest that EU member states could decide to only issue approvals to CDM projects on the basis of a HRIA.
Secondly, several EU countries are themselves substantial buyers of CERs. They could therefore require the same safeguards from the projects they purchase CERs from as Cournil et al (2012) propose for the issuance of letters of approval.
Thirdly, the EU could decide to only allow credits from projects in the EU ETS that have undergone an HRIA. In addition, since each CER has a unique serial number which includes a project identifier, CERs from projects that are involved in human rights violations could also be individually banned from use in the EU ETS.
The unique serial numbers also offer potential to use naming and shaming by publicly denouncing CERs from problematic projects as 'toxic' assets, in order to discourage potential buyers from acquiring those CERs.
Introduction of mandatory human rights safeguards would increase the CDM's transaction costs. A sense of the size of the additional cost that would be caused by introduction of human rights safeguards may be gained by analysis of the CDM Gold
Standard, a voluntary label that includes social and environmental criteria as well as mandatory procedures for how to conduct local stakeholder consultations. An empirical study of Gold Standard projects found that the project developers generally deemed the requirements to be manageable with a reasonable amount of additional work (Sterk et al. 2009 ). The introduction of human rights safeguards can thus be expected to entail a significant but not insurmountable cost impact. From the viewpoint of human rights there is no excuse to make the most vulnerable groups bear the social costs of mitigation in order for industrialised countries to be able to exercise their emission rights (Schade 2012) .
Finally, the human rights dimension of the restructuring of economies is not only an issue for the CDM but also for other mechanisms and initiatives to foment low-fossil economies. These should equally be reviewed for their human rights implications.
